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Abstract
Proposition 209 banned the use of racial preferences in admissions at public colleges in
California. We analyze unique data for all applicants and enrollees within the University
of California (UC) system before and after Prop 209. After Prop 209, minority graduation
rates increased by 4.35 percentage points. We present evidence that certain
institutions are better at graduating more-prepared students while other institutions
are better at graduating less-prepared students and that these matching effects are
particularly important for the bottom tail of the qualification distribution. We find that
Prop 209 led to a more efficient sorting of minority students, explaining 18% of the
graduation rate increase in our preferred specification. Further, there appears to have
been behavioral responses to Prop 209, by universities and/or students, that explain
between 23% and 64% of the graduation rate increase.
JEL codes: I28; J15
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1 Introduction
Over the past several years, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken up and decided sev-
eral cases concerning the constitutionality of race-based preferences (affirmative action)
in university admissions1. One of the arguments opponents of affirmative action have
advanced is that affirmative action actually hurts the individuals it is supposed to
help – themismatch hypothesis. According to themismatch hypothesis, affirmative action
in admissions actually results in worse outcomes for minority students as students admit-
ted under affirmative action are attending colleges where the curriculum is designed for
students with significantly stronger credentials2.
In this paper we examine the mismatch hypothesis in the context of college graduation
rates. As documented in Turner (2004), Bound and Turner (2007, 2011), and Bound et al.
(2010), while the number of students attending college has increased over the past three
decades in the U.S., college graduation rates (i.e., the fraction of college enrollees that
graduate) and college attainment rates (i.e., the fraction of the population with a college
degree) have hardly changed since 1970 and the time it takes college students to complete
a baccalaureate (BA) degree has increased (Bound et al. 2012). The disparities between
the trends in college attendance and completion or time-to-completion of college degrees
is all the more stark given that the earnings premium for a college degree relative to a high
school degree nearly doubled over this same period (Goldin and Katz 2008).
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We examine differences in graduation rates and the academic preparation of minority
and non-minority students attending the various UC campuses between the years 1995–
2000, using a unique source of student-level data that covers the universe of students who
applied to one or more of the UC campuses. We obtained these data from the University
of California Office of the President, the administrative offices of the entire UC system
and refer to them as the “UCOP” data. The UCOP data cover a period where race-
based preferences were banned in California. In 1996, the voters of California approved
Proposition 209 – Prop 209 hereafter – which stipulates that: “The state shall not discrim-
inate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting”. The Proposition took effect in 1998.
Using these student-level data, we find evidence that the graduation rates of minori-
ties increased after Prop 209 was implemented. Indeed, the data reveal that under-
represented minorities were 4.4 percentage points more likely to graduate in the period
after Prop 209 that the period before3. We also find that the distribution of minorities
entering the UC system shifted from its more selective campuses (e.g., UC Berkeley and
UCLA) towards its less selective ones. Moreover, while there was an overall improvement
in the academic preparation of minorities enrolling at UC campuses after Prop 209 went
into effect, the greatest improvements occurred at the less-selective campuses. Taken
together, this evidence may be consistent with the mismatch hypothesis noted above.
As we argue below, the scope for the mismatch of students to campuses with affirmative
action and its alleviation with bans on its use hinges on whether some campuses, presum-
ably less-selective ones, are better-suited to produce positive outcomes, e.g., graduation
rates, for less-prepared students while other universities, typically more-selective ones,
are better-suited for more-prepared students. In contrast, if more-selective universities
were able to produce better outcomes, such as graduation rates, for students of all levels
of preparation than less-selective ones, then there is no scope for student-university mis-
match. Bans on affirmative action would not be expected to improve the graduation rates
of minority students, especially those with weaker backgrounds.We formalize these argu-
ments below, characterizing and estimating graduation production functions for each of
the UC campuses and examining whether and how they differ across campuses.
The student-level UCOP data we examine also reveal that after Prop 209 there was a
decline in the number of under-represented minorities enrolled at one of the UC cam-
puses. And, if the minority students who did not attend a UC campus after Prop 209 were
the least prepared, then graduation rates would have likely risen, regardless of the cam-
pus they would have attended. That is, Prop 209 may have induced a significant selection
effect on minority enrollments within the UC system that would provide an alternative
explanation to mismatch for why minority graduation rates improved.
To separate mismatch and selection explanations for the post-Prop 209 minority grad-
uation rate increases, we exploit the richness of the UCOP data on cohorts of students
that entered the UC system before and after Prop 209. These data contain measures of
high school GPAs and SAT scores and of parental income and education, which allow
us to both control for these factors in evaluating the effects of Prop 209 and assess how
they influence minority (and non-minority) graduation probabilities at the various UC
campuses. The UCOP data provide information not only on which UC campus a stu-
dent enrolled (as well as whether they graduated from that campus), but also on the other
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UC campuses to which they applied and the ones to which they were admitted. We use
the information on the UC campuses to which students were admitted, and the qual-
ity of those UC campuses, to implement a modified version of the method used in Dale
and Krueger (2002) to control for student qualifications beyond those measured by high
school GPA and test scores.
We decompose the post-Prop 209 change in minority graduation rates into three com-
ponents: better matching, better students, and a third, residual, category of post-Prop 209
change in graduation rates not accounted for by the matching or selection. We refer to
the latter (residual) component as other behavioral responses to the Prop 209 affirmative
action ban.While we cannot directly characterize them, these behavioral responses could
have been the results of universities investingmore in their students and/or changes made
by minority students that improved their college academic outcomes.
We find that bettermatching explains around 18% of the improvement inminority grad-
uation rates within the UC system. However, this relatively small overall effect masks two
notable phenomena related to the potential role of matching. First, we find that match-
ing is much more important in accounting for the graduation gains of students in the
bottom of the academic preparedness distribution. Second, as we discuss in Section 7,
Arcidiacono et al. (2013) find that improved matching played a much more prominent
role in improved graduation rates of minorities who initially enrolled at UC campuses in
STEM (Science, Technology and Engineering) majors, especially in the higher rates that
minorities who started in STEMmajors actually graduated with a STEM degree.
We find that between 18% and 59% of the minority graduation rate increase is due to
changes in student characteristics, both observed and unobserved, of those enrolled in
the UC system after Prop 209. We note that the changes in the characteristics of minority
enrollees post-209 are not all in the same direction. While some measures of preparation
were higher in the post Prop 209 period (high school grades and SAT scores) other mea-
sures actually fell (parental income and parental education). Hence, the pool of minority
enrollees actually became more diverse from a socioeconomic perspective4.
Finally, somewhere between 23% and 64% of the minority graduation gains cannot
be explained either by selection or matching. There is some evidence that this residual
consist of behavioral responses to Prop 209. Below, we present anecdotal evidence that
suggests that universities responded to Prop 209 by focusing more resources on the reten-
tion of their enrolled students, especially minorities and/or students from disadvantaged
background, to increase their retention and graduation rates. And with respect to changes
in the academic performance of minority students attending UC campuses, research by
Antonovics and Sander (2013) on enrollments conditional on admittance suggests the
possibility that minorities may have felt more comfortable at universities where profes-
sors and peers know that they were admitted on the basis of academic credentials and not
their race or ethnicity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the UCOP
data and present the unadjusted levels and post-Prop 209 changes in minority and white
student enrollments, measures of their academic preparation and their graduation rates.
In Section 3 we examine how much of the increased graduation rates for the UC system
as a whole remain after accounting for changes in observables. After showing that a sub-
stantial portion of the graduation gap is unexplained, in Section 4 we characterize the
mismatch hypothesis and establish the conditions it requires in terms of the differences
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across colleges in their capacity to produce graduates with disparate academic prepara-
tion. In Section 5 we develop and estimate a model of college graduation that embeds
campus-specific graduation production functions that depend on student preparation
using only data in the pre-Prop 209 period. The estimates in Section 5 serve as one of the
inputs of the decomposition of the changes in graduation rates after Prop 209. Section 6
decomposes the increased graduation rates following Prop 209, focusing in particular on
the roles of better matching, changes in the selection of students who enrolled in the UC
system, and behavioral responses to Prop 209. Section 7 concludes.
2 Graduation patterns in the UC system before and after Prop 209
The data we use were obtained from the University of California Office of the President
(UCOP) under a California Public Records Act request. These data contain information
on applicants, enrollees and graduates of the UC system. Due to confidentiality concerns,
some individual-level information was suppressed. In particular, the UCOP data we were
provided have the following limitations5:
1. The data are aggregated into three year intervals from 1992–2006.
2. The data provide no information on gender, and race is aggregated into four
categories: white, Asian, minority, and other
3. Academic data, such as SAT scores and high school grade point average (GPA),
were only provided as categorical variables, rather than the actual scores and GPAs.
Weighed against these limitations is having access to two important pieces of informa-
tion about the individuals who applied to and possibly enrolled at a UC campus. First,
we have information on every individual who applied to any of the campuses in the UC
system over the period, including to which campuses they applied and were admitted.
As described below, we use the latter information to adapt a strategy used in Dale and
Krueger (2002) in order to account for unmeasured student qualifications. Second, we
were provided with access to an index of each student’s preparation for college, given by
the sum of a student’s SAT I score, rescaled to be between 0 to 600, and his or her high
school GPA, rescaled to be between 0 to 400. Below, we refer to this as a student’s high
schoolAcademic Index (AI). We have data for the entering cohorts in the three years prior
to the implementation of Prop 209 (1995, 1996, 1997), and for three years after its passage
(1998, 1999, 2000).
In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the individual-level UCOP data and its
measures of student qualifications by race and for applicants, admits, enrollees and grad-
uates for campuses in the UC system, pre- and post-Prop 2096. The first panel gives the
descriptive statistics for under-represented minorities (URMs). As a fraction of the num-
ber of minority graduates from California’s public high schools7, enrollment rates fell
from 4.6% to 3.6%. Conditional on enrolling, minority graduation rates increased by 4.4
percentage points8 off a base rate of 62.4% post-Prop 2099. While the share of white high
school graduates who applied, attended, and graduated in the UC system all did not sig-
nificantly change post-Prop 209 (second panel), graduation rates conditional on enrolling
also showed a significant increase at 2.5 percentage points.
With respect to applications at UC campuses before and after Prop 209, while appli-
cations by URMs increased, as a share of California public high school graduates they











Table 1 Characteristics of UC applicants, admits, and enrollees by race, pre-Prop 209 and change post Prop 209†
Applied Admitted Enrolled Graduated
Pre- Pre- Pre- Pre-
Prop 209 Change Prop 209 Change Prop 209 Change Prop 209 Change
Under-representedMinorities:
No. of Minorities 31,002 2,493 24,352 -472 13,291 -714 8,205 91
High School Acad. Index 619.7 14.7*** 645.7 17.2*** 641.5 15.6*** 653.7 12.4***
Parents have BA 0.369 0.004 0.381 -0.014*** 0.385 -0.039*** 0.417 -0.046***
Parents’ Income ≤ $30K 0.379 -0.019*** 0.364 -0.008* 0.364 0.008 0.334 0.012
Parents’ Income ≥ $80K 0.195 0.015*** 0.203 0.009** 0.211 -0.010* 0.238 -0.018***
Graduation Rate‡ 0.624 0.044***
Share of Calif. Public HS Grads 0.107 -0.011*** 0.084 -0.016*** 0.046 -0.010*** 0.028 -0.005*
Whites:
No. of Whites 67,986 8,217 54,571 4,398 27,652 1,937 20,791 2,210
High School Acad. Index 710.4 11.1*** 729.8 8.8*** 722.6 13.3*** 730.7 12.4***
Parents have BA 0.801 -0.002 0.813 -0.010*** 0.805 -0.008** 0.822 -0.008**
Parents’ Income ≤ $30K 0.103 -0.008*** 0.101 -0.006*** 0.109 -0.006*** 0.100 -0.006*
Parents’ Income ≥ $80K 0.528 0.019*** 0.533 0.013*** 0.525 0.015*** 0.540 0.016***
Graduation Rate‡ 0.769 0.025***
Share of Calif. Public HS Grads 0.187 0.003 0.150 -0.003 0.076 -0.002 0.057 0.000
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Data Source: UCOP individual data, Pre-Prop 209 (1995–97); Post-Prop 209 (1998–2000).
Variables: No. of Observations is the total number of students who engaged in activity indicated in column heading; No. of Obs./No. of HS Grads is ratio of a column’s No. of Observations to the number of public high school
graduates per year in California; Graduation Rate is share of enrolled students that graduated in 5 years or less; High School Acad. Index is sum of re-scaled student’s SAT I score (0 to 600 scale) plus re-scaled student’s
UC-adjusted high school GPA (0 to 400 scale); Parents have BA is indicator variable of whether student has at least one parent with Bachelor Degree or more; Parents’ Income≤ $30K is indicator variable for whether parents’
annual income is ≤ $30,000, where Pre-Prop 209 income are inflation-adjusted to Post-Prop 209 levels; Parents’ Income≥ $80K is corresponding variable whether parents’ annual income is ≥ $80,000; and where Graduated
denotes those who graduated in 5 years or less.
†Descriptive statistics for Asian Americans and Others (including Unknowns) are omitted from table, but are available in the Additional file 1.
‡Totals in each category include occasional cases with missing data; when calculating average sample characteristics, individuals missing that data are dropped. This includes enrollees with missing graduation information,
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where minorities are less likely to apply under the new admissions rules. However, other
evidence suggests otherwise. For example, using the same UCOP data as used in this
paper, Antonovics and Sander (2013) argue that Prop 209 resulted in a warming, rather
than a chilling, effect, in that minorities, as a group, were more likely to enroll in the
UC campus conditional on being admitted and Antonovics and Backes (2013a) show
that the sending of SAT scores by minority applicants to UC campuses did not change
post-Prop 209.
With respect to academic preparation as measured by the student’s academic index,
minorities had much lower scores at each stage of the college process than whites both
prior to and after Prop 209 was implemented (Table 1). This difference in academic prepa-
ration accounts, in part, for the lower proportion of minority high school students being
admitted to a UC campus (“Share of Calif. HS Grads”) compared to whites. However,
after Prop 209 is implemented, the academic preparation of minority applicants, admits,
enrollees, and graduates improved, both absolutely and relative to whites. This improve-
ment in academic preparation of the minority students that enrolled at a UC campus
after Prop 209 suggests that changes in minority student selectivity with respect to aca-
demic preparation noted in the Introduction may have accounted for some, if not all, of
the improved graduation rates of minorities after the implementation of Prop 209.
But, the change in the selectivity of enrolled minority students with Prop 209 may not
have improved uniformly. As shown in Table 1, there was a significant and sizable decline
in the proportion of minority enrollees and graduates from more “advantaged” family
backgrounds after Prop 209 went into effect. Among admitted minorities who actually
enrolled at a UC campus, there was an 0.039 reduction (a 10% decline) in the propor-
tion with parents who had a BA degree and a corresponding 0.046 reduction (an 11%
decline) among those minorities that graduated from a UC campus after Prop 209 was
implemented. Similarly, post-Prop 209 a greater share of applicants and admits had par-
ents with incomes above $80,000. Yet, the share of enrollees whose parental income was
greater that $80,000 fell. That is, while minorities from more advantaged family back-
grounds continued to apply and be admitted to UC campuses after Prop 209 (though
the set of UC campuses where they were admitted may have changed), they were less
likely to enroll at one of the campuses and less likely to graduate from one of them10.
This decline in minority students frommore advantaged backgrounds that enrolled at UC
campuses after Prop 209 would seem to work against improved graduation rates, given
previous findings that students from wealthier and better educated parents do better
in college11.
We next consider how graduation rates and academic preparation varied across UC
campuses before and after Prop 209. Table 2 gives the distribution of both for minorities
and whites, respectively. The campuses are listed in order of their overall academic index
which roughly corresponds to their U.S. News & World Report ranking as of the fall of
199712. We use this ranking throughout our study as our measure of the selectivity and/or
quality of the UC campuses. Focusing initially on the pre-Prop 209 tabulations, one sees
that the academic index and graduation rates are systematically related to the rankings
of UC campuses, with more-selective campuses having students that are better prepared
and more likely to graduate. This is true for minorities and for whites. And, consistent
with the tabulations in Table 1, whites have higher academic indices and graduation rates











Table 2 High school academic index (AI) and college graduation rates by UC campus for minorities & whites, pre- & post-Prop 209
Under-represented Minorities Whites
Academic Index Grad. Rate Academic Index Grad. Rate
Pre-Prop 209 Pre-Prop 209
Campus‡ Mean S.D. Change Pre Prop 209 Change Mean S.D. Change Pre Prop 209 Change
UC Berkeley 679 91 15 0.675 0.030 794 82 5 0.847 0.026
UCLA 674 78 29 0.656 0.057 766 76 19 0.839 0.036
UC San Diego 681 69 40 0.661 0.061 760 55 13 0.826 -0.005
UC Davis 637 88 12 0.540 0.091 721 69 3 0.776 0.009
UC Irvine 621 78 34 0.626 0.039 693 83 8 0.685 0.047
UC Santa Barbara 605 78 44 0.599 0.104 682 67 34 0.743 0.054
UC Santa Cruz 590 101 29 0.598 0.044 683 73 5 0.688 0.033
UC Riverside 582 87 15 0.583 0.005 669 86 0 0.636 -0.014
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The changes in student preparedness and graduation rates post-Prop 209 are not
ordered according to the selectivity of the various campuses (Table 2). For example, UC
Santa Barbara had the largest post-Prop 209 improvements in student academic pre-
paredness and graduation rates, even though it ranked sixth out of the eight UC campuses
in the U.S. News & World Report rankings. Furthermore, UC Berkeley and UC Riverside,
which were the top and bottom ranked UC campuses, were both in the bottom third of
post-Prop 209 gains in minority academic preparedness and graduation rates.
Taken together, the across-campus changes that occur in minority graduation rates and
the academic preparation of those minorities that do enroll is potentially consistent with
the view that the Prop 209 ban of affirmative action resulted in minority students being
bettermatched to campuses based on their academic preparation. But as noted earlier, this
improvement also may be consistent with greater selectivity in UC minority enrollments
post-Prop 209.
3 Adjusting graduation gains for changes in observables
In the period after Prop 209 graduation rates increased for under-represented minorities
by 4.4 percentage points and increased for whites by 2.5 percentage points. But charac-
teristics of the entering students changed as well, with both under-represented minorities
and whites coming in with higher academic indexes but lower parental education. Here
we examine how much of the increase in graduation rates can be accounted for after con-
trolling for changes in observables. We also investigate how the changes in graduation
rates differ across different levels of the academic index.
LettingGit denote whether individual iwho entered college in period t graduated within
five years, we first specify Git as depending on whether the individual was in the period
post-Prop 209, POSTit , a flexible function of observable characteristics Xit , and an error
term, it :
Git = α0POSTit + f (Xit) + it (1)
We estimate several versions of (1) where we control for academic index, add controls
for parental education, income, and initial major, and then add interactions between the
academic index and the other variables. We estimate (1) separately for under-represented
minorities and whites.
To assess how the graduation gains vary with a student’s academic index, we interact
whether the individual was in the post-Prop 209 period with their quartile in the academic
index distribution. We specify the academic index quartiles separately for minorities
and whites, using the pre-Prop 209 distribution of the academic index for enrollees.
Denoting Qit as the quartile of the academic index distribution for student i at time t,
Qit ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we specify Git as:
Git = α0POSTit +
3∑
q=1
αqI(Qit = q)POSTit + f (Xit) + it , (2)
where the graduation gains are then relative to those in the top quartile.
Results are presented in Table 3. Estimates of (1) show that controlling for the academic
index reduces the overall graduation gains for under-represented minorities and whites
2014, 3:7
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Table 3 pre- to post-Prop 209 changes in graduation rates: without & with controls
Regression coefficient on:
Regression POST× POST× POST×
Specification: POST Q1(AI)§ Q2(AI) Q3(AI)
Under-representedMinorities
No Controls 0.044***
Control for AI 0.030***
Extended Controls 1† 0.031***
Extended Controls 2‡ 0.030***
Control for AI 0.005 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.028**
Extended Controls 1† 0.008 0.037** 0.031** 0.028**
Extended Controls 2‡ 0.005 0.035** 0.037*** 0.035***
Whites
No Controls 0.025***
Control for AI 0.013***
Extended Controls 1† 0.014***
Extended Controls 2‡ 0.014***
Control for AI 0.013** -0.006 0.008 0.000
Extended Controls 1† 0.012** -0.003 0.009 0.001
Extended Controls 2‡ 0.011* -0.002 0.011 0.002
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
§Academic index quartiles are based on pre-Prop 209 enrollees and are group specific: breakpoints for the quartiles vary by
minority/white status.
†Extended controls 1 include parents’ education & income, initial major and AI.
‡Extended controls 2 include parents’ education & income, initial major, alone and crossed with AI (and AI alone).
by 1.4 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively13. These reductions correspond to 29% of
the graduation gains for under-represented minorities and 48% of the graduation gains
for whites. Adding additional controls–parental education, income, and initial major–has
little effect on these baseline results, if anything slightly raising the estimated graduation
gains.
Table 3 also shows how the graduation gains vary across the academic index dis-
tribution. For under-represented minorities, the gains are concentrated in the bottom
quartiles, with all specifications showing significantly higher gains for those in the bottom
three quartiles relative to the top quartile. This is consistent withmismatch in that remov-
ing affirmative action means students in the lower quartiles are attending campuses that
better match their levels of preparation. In contrast, the gains for whites are fairly uniform
across the quartiles of the academic index distribution. The results for whites suggests
the possibility of campuses responding to Prop 209, particularly since Prop 209 had little
to no effect on the share of white students at each of the campuses, implying matching
effects for whites are likely to be small.
The differences in the graduation gains between under-represented minorities and
whites then motivates the possibility that the match between the campus and the stu-
dent is important in determining graduation outcomes. But the evidence for whites also
suggests something happened with the implementation of Prop 209 such that gradua-
tion rates improved for all levels of academic preparation. In the next section we develop
a model that is flexible enough to capture these matching effects and return to the
possibility of campuses responding to the passage of Prop 209 in Section 6.
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4 Themismatch hypothesis and campus graduation production functions
In this section, we characterize the mismatch hypothesis as it applies to minority grad-
uation rates. To fix ideas, consider the following characterization of the graduation
production function for one of the UC campuses. Let Pr(g = 1|AI, j) denote the gradua-
tion rate that campus j can produce for a minority student with an academic preparation
index of AI. We shall maintain the assumption throughout that these campus-specific
functions take the following linear form,
Pr(g = 1|AI, j) = φ0j + φ1jAI (3)
for UC campus j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. In the remainder of this section, we also shall assume that
Pr(g = 1|AI, j) is increasing in AI, i.e., φ1j > 0. (We do not restrict φ1j > 0 when
estimating these campus-specific production functions below).
One could proceed by specifying the admission criteria of campuses in the presence and
absence of affirmative action, characterizing the criteria students have for the campuses
to which they apply and to which they enroll if admitted and that campuses use in its
admission decisions and, thus, the matching of students to colleges (or alternative activ-
ities)14. For the purposes of assessing the mismatch hypothesis, it is sufficient to assume
that relative to an affirmative action regime, a college under an affirmative action ban will
place less (or no) weight on the diversity of an incoming student body and more weight
on selecting students based on their academic preparation or AI. The mismatch hypothe-
sis asserts that, under affirmative action, minority students are more likely to be matched
to higher quality colleges for which they are less well-prepared than their non-minority
counterparts. By banning affirmative action, this form of mismatch of minority students
will be reduced, i.e., minority students will be “better matched” to colleges on the basis of
their academic preparation (AI), and the outcomes of minorities, such as their graduation
rates, will improve15.
The validity of this mismatch explanation hinges on whether colleges differ in their
graduation production functions and how they differ between high-quality (more selec-
tive) and lower quality (less selective) colleges. To see this, consider Figure 1, which
illustrates two possibilities for the relationship between the production functions of a
more-selective college,Campus A, and a less-selective one,Campus B. Panel (a) illustrates
the case where Campus A has an absolute advantage over Campus B in producing higher
graduation rates for students of all levels of academic preparation (AI). At the same time,
the way Panel (a) is drawn, the higher quality campus, A, has a comparative advantage at
producing higher graduation rates among better prepared students than Campus B. This
latter assumption provides a motivation for why better prepared students tend to attend
higher quality colleges.
For the predictions of the mismatch hypothesis to hold, one requires a stronger set of
differences between the production functions of higher- and lower-quality campuses. To
see this, consider Panel (b) of Figure 1. As before, Campus A has a comparative advantage
in graduating better prepared students. Now, however, Campus A only has an absolute
advantage in the production of graduations for better prepared students, i.e., only for
AI > AI. And, Campus B now has an absolute advantage in the production of graduations
for less-prepared students (AI < AI). Now consider what happens to a minority student
2014, 3:7
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a
b
Figure 1 Alternative relationships between graduation production functions of higher and lower
quality campuses. In (a), Campus A has a comparative advantage for better-prepared students and an
absolute advantage for all students; in (b), Campus A has a comparative advantage for better-prepared
students, but Campus B has an absolute advantage for all students with an AI below AI.
with academic preparationAI1 who was admitted and attended Campus A under affirma-
tive action but is no longer able to get into Campus A once affirmative action is banned16.
Because Campus B has an absolute advantage in graduating less prepared students, this
student’s likelihood of graduating from college increases by enrolling in Campus B, as the
mismatch hypothesis predicts17.
As the above discussion makes clear, the mismatch hypothesis requires lower-quality
(less selective) universities to have an absolute advantage, and not just a compara-
tive advantage, in graduating less academically prepared minority students. In the next
section, we estimate campus-specific graduation production functions for each of the
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5 Estimatingmatching effects prior to Prop 209
The previous section outlined the flexibility needed in the graduation production func-
tion in order to operationalize the mismatch hypothesis. In this section, we present the
basic model we estimate to gauge the importance of the match between the campus and
the student to graduation outcomes. The specification relies only on data before Prop 209,
essentially comparing graduation outcomes of students from different campuses but who
had otherwise similar observed characteristics.
While Section 3 could be criticized for failing to account for post-Prop 209 minor-
ity enrollees being stronger in unobservable dimensions than pre-Prop 209 minority
enrollees – and hence biasing the estimated effects of Prop 209 on minority graduation
rates upward – the concern is the opposite when examining match effects using only the
pre-Prop 209 data. Namely, minority students at highly ranked UC campuses are likely
stronger on unobserved dimensions than minority students at lower ranked campuses.
To address this issue, we take the approach used by Dale and Krueger (2002) and add
to the baseline specification characteristics of the UC campuses where minority students
submitted applications as well as characteristics of the campuses where minority students
were admitted.
As we will show, results from both the baseline specification and from the Dale and
Krueger approach show that the more highly ranked UC campuses have a comparative
advantage in graduating more prepared students. Further, lower ranked UC campuses
appear to have an absolute advantage in graduating students at the bottom of the distri-
bution, suggesting the possibility that one of the reasons for the increased in graduation
rates after Prop 209 was due to minority students being better matched.
5.1 Baseline model
Our baseline model simply extends the model from the previous section also to allow
the probability of graduating to depend on her family background characteristics, Xit , to
capture the influence of financial constraints and preferences and allowing the production
function parameters to vary with the time period – pre-Prop 209 vs. post-Prop 209 –
to allow for behavioral responses to these regime changes. Let Gijt denote an indicator
of whether minority student i who enrolled at UC campus j in Prop 209 regime t, t =
PRE,POST , graduated. We then specify Gijt as18:
Gijt = φ0jt + φ1jtAIit + Xitφ2t + ζit , (4)
where φ0jt and φ1jt are the parameters of the campus-specific production function in (3)
and where ζit is an error term that captures unobserved (to the econometrician) student
preferences and characteristics. Our baseline estimates are found by simply regressing
the graduation outcomes of the students on their observed characteristics, allowing the
intercept and slope to vary by the UC campus attended.
5.2 Dale and Kruger controls
Ideally, a student’s unobserved preferences and characteristics captured by ζit would
be independent from which campus they attended, their AIit and their family back-
ground, Xit . If so, the parameters in Linear Probability Model in (4) would be consistently
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estimated using standard regression methods. But some of a student’s unobserved char-
acteristics are likely to correlated with the quality/selectivity of the campus they attend.
As has been noted in the literature19, failure to control for the full set of factors will likely
to result in biased estimates of the effects of attending more-selective colleges on the
outcomes of interest.
To help mitigate this source of selection bias, we implement an approach similar to Dale
and Krueger (2002) in which we estimate an extension of (4) in which we also control for
the UC campuses to which students applied and were admitted as well as measures of
the quality/selectivity of these campuses. We use alternative sets of measures to imple-
ment our version of Dale-Krueger. Let DK (k)i the the kth set of campus quality/selectivity
measures. Then the associated Dale-Krueger selection-adjustment for campus-specific
minority graduation probabilities is given by:
Gijt = φ(k)0jt + φ(k)1jt AIit + Xiφ(k)2t + DK (k)it ψ(k)t + ζ (k)it , (5)
where φ(k)0jt and φ
(k)
1jt again denote the campus-specific graduation production function
parameters in (3), now adjusted not only for student background characteristics (Xit) but
also for Dale-Krueger controls, DK (k)i . To assess the robustness of our estimates of φ0jt
and φ1jt , we employ for four alternative specifications of DK (k)i . They are:
• Specification 1: Adds a set of indicator variables for whether the individual applied
and was admitted to each of the eight UC campuses (sixteen indicator variables in all)
to the baseline specification.
• Specification 2: Adds the number of UC campuses where the individual submitted
applications and was admitted in each of the three tiers of UC campuses to
Specification 1.
• Specification 3: Adds indicator variables for the highest ranked campus where the
individual was admitted to the baseline specification.
• Specification 4: Adds the average academic index of the UC campuses where the
individual submitted applications and was admitted to Specification 2.
For the Dale and Krueger strategy employed in (5) to be successful in accounting for
selection in the estimation of these graduation production function parameters, it must
be the case that students do not always attend the best UC campus to which they were
admitted. In Table 4 we look at students who were admitted to different pairs of cam-
puses and examine the probability of attending each campus in the pair, based onminority
students who were admitted during the pre-Prop 209 period. Conditional on attending
one of the campuses in the pair, the entries above the diagonal give the share that attend
the campus along the row while the entries below the diagonal give the number of stu-
dents that were admitted to the pair and attended one of the two campuses. Hence, 1,763
minority students were admitted to both UC Berkeley and UCLA in the pre-Prop 209
period and chose to attend one of these two campuses. Of the 1763, 53.3% chose to attend
Berkeley.With only a few exceptions, the numbers above the diagonal in Table 4 are above
fifty percent. This suggests that our ordering of colleges is reasonable as, conditional on
being admitted to both campuses and enrolling in one of them, students are more likely
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Table 4 Attendance decisions of minority students admitted to different pairs of UC
campuses for pre-Prop 209 period
UC UC UC Santa UC Santa UC
Berkeley UCLA San Diego UC Davis UC Irvine Barbara Cruz Riverside
Under-representedminorities:
Pre-Prop 209
UC Berkeley – 53.3% 76.6% 81.1% 81.7% 85.9% 87.9% 83.1%
UCLA 1,763 – 75.3% 80.5% 81.5% 87.3% 88.5% 83.0%
UC San Diego 834 1,194 – 53.9% 66.0% 62.8% 70.6% 66.8%
UC Davis 958 713 473 – 54.1% 55.6% 65.6% 64.3%
UC Irvine 416 1,160 438 364 – 49.9% 57.9% 64.3%
UC Santa Barbara 737 1,073 637 666 577 – 63.8% 62.0%
UC Santa Cruz 602 400 296 489 214 776 – 43.7%
UC Riverside 237 587 250 252 563 471 247 –
Post-Prop 209
UC Berkeley – 53.1% 77.6% 89.6% 88.5% 91.4% 93.6% 90.4%
UCLA 855 – 80.8% 87.9% 91.9% 92.3% 93.2% 91.5%
UC San Diego 491 854 – 71.9% 73.5% 70.2% 82.3% 74.7%
UC Davis 548 488 385 – 53.1% 48.1% 77.0% 66.8%
UC Irvine 269 692 438 390 – 45.8% 65.4% 67.3%
UC Santa Barbara 451 755 541 572 592 – 75.5% 72.1%
UC Santa Cruz 264 265 192 473 272 691 – 45.2%
UC Riverside 208 492 253 374 756 628 504 –
Whites:
Pre-Prop 209
UC Berkeley – 65.7% 77.9% 79.9% 81.8% 84.3% 85.2% 83.3%
UCLA 1,923 – 72.9% 77.5% 85.0% 83.8% 84.9% 79.5%
UC San Diego 1,606 2,275 – 63.6% 79.1% 69.1% 73.4% 79.2%
UC Davis 1,337 1,170 2,274 – 72.7% 55.9% 64.1% 80.3%
UC Irvine 373 919 1,105 802 – 35.3% 51.7% 68.5%
UC Santa Barbara 924 1,411 2,410 2,833 1,517 – 61.7% 81.3%
UC Santa Cruz 710 392 997 1,568 412 2,947 – 66.6%
UC Riverside 108 273 437 351 537 672 308 –
Post-Prop 209
UC Berkeley – 59.5% 79.5% 82.4% 90.8% 88.8% 88.9% 88.9%
UCLA 2,270 – 78.0% 84.2% 90.2% 88.2% 91.8% 84.5%
UC San Diego 1,867 2,722 – 69.8% 82.7% 67.3% 79.6% 81.2%
UC Davis 1,411 1,304 2,051 – 71.0% 44.9% 71.5% 83.2%
UC Irvine 414 1,006 1,073 910 – 26.6% 55.0% 73.6%
UC Santa Barbara 1,211 2,014 2,617 2,682 1,374 – 76.7% 85.4%
UC Santa Cruz 606 464 805 1669 567 2,335 – 69.1%
UC Riverside 135 343 436 601 762 809 637 –
For Row A, Column B, value of cell is: Above diagonal: If admitted to Campus A and B, Pr(Attends A|Attends A or B); Below
diagonal: Number in race-period group admitted to Campus A and B and attended Campus A or B. (A student admitted to
more than two campuses will appear in this count multiple times).
to attend the higher-ranked campus. However, Table 4 also reveals that a non-trivial
share of students attend the lower ranked campus. This is particularly true for minori-
ties in the pre-Prop 209 period where in all cases at least 10 percent of students chose
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5.3 Results
Estimates of the campus-specific parameters, φ0jt and φ1jt , for the Baseline Model in
(4) and for four Dale-Krueger control model specifications in (5) using pre-Prop 209
(t = PRE) data on minorities are presented in Table 5. The models are estimated so that
the academic index (AI) is normalized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of
one for minority enrollees in the pre-Prop 209 period. Both the campus-specific inter-
cepts and slopes are measured relative to the intercept and slope for UC Riverside20. The
campus-specific intercepts then reflect the difference in graduation rates for a minority
enrollee at the average AI score, and the slopes are now normalized to be the percentage
point gain in expected graduation resulting from a one standard deviation increase in the
academic index.
The general pattern across the specifications suggests that themore highly-ranked cam-
puses reward (penalize) students with high (low) academic indexes. Exceptions are UC
Table 5 Intercepts and slopes for UC campus-specific minority graduation rates for
pre-Prop-209 period
Model Specification:
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4)
Campus-Specific Intercepts:
UC Berkeley 0.018 -0.016 -0.020 -0.074*** -0.025
UCLA -0.007 -0.037 -0.042 -0.078*** -0.046*
UC San Diego 0.010 -0.029 -0.035 -0.058** -0.038
UC Davis -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.065** -0.135*** -0.069**
UC Irvine 0.036* 0.009 0.010 -0.023 0.006
UC Santa Barbara 0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.014 -0.005
Santa Cruz 0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.016 0.003
Campus-Specific Slopes:
AI 0.053*** 0.034** 0.036** 0.034** 0.031**
UC Berkeley 0.023 0.030* 0.025 0.042** 0.033*
UCLA 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.078*** 0.071***
UC San Diego 0.047** 0.059** 0.054** 0.063** 0.060**
UC Davis 0.055 *** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.071*** 0.063***
UC Irvine 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.035 0.029
UC Santa Barbara 0.021 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.024
UC Santa Cruz -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Campus-specific intercepts are evaluated at mean academic index for pre-209 Minority students and are measured relative
to UC Riverside.
Campus-specific slope coefficients on standardized academic index variable, AIstd,r,t for r = Minority and t = Pre − 209. Each
coefficient measures the effect of a one S.D. increase in academic index on probability of graduation and these effects are
measured relative of that for UC Riverside.
All specifications include the following control variables: parents’ income and education and initial major.
Specification 1 adds a full set of dummy variables indicating whether the student applied to and/or admitted to each of the
eight UC campuses.
Specification 2 adds to Specification 1 the number of campuses applied to and admitted to for each of three tiers of UC
campuses, with Tier 1 which includes UC Berkeley, UCLA and UC San Diego, Tier 2 which includes UC Davis, UC Irvine and UC
Santa Barbara, and Tier 3 which includes UC Santa Cruz and UC Riverside, and also dummy variables that indicate whether a
student applied to campuses in the Tier above or in the Tier below the Tier to which they were admitted.
Specification 3 includes the base specification plus a set of dummies for the highest ranked campus a student was admitted
to.
Specification 4 includes the controls in Specification 2, plus a student’s total number of applications and admissions,
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Davis’ slope coefficient, which is higher than its rank, and UC Berkeley’s slope coeffi-
cient, which is lower than its rank. With the exception of the baseline specification, the
average minority enrollee would see a higher probability of graduating from any of the
four bottom-ranked campuses than at any of the four top-ranked campuses, between
2 and 6.5 percentage points higher for Specification 4 depending on the campuses.
With 60% of minority enrollees at the top four campuses in the pre-Prop 209 period,
there would appear to be scope for increasing graduation rates through less aggressive
affirmative action policies. While the differences in intercepts are often not statistically
different, the point estimates are large. For example, Specification 4 shows that the aver-
age minority enrollee would be 4.6 percentage points less likely to graduate at UCLA
than at UC Riverside. Highlighting the importance of match effects, if the student was
one-standard deviation below the minority mean, the difference would increase to 11.7
percentage points. But if the student was one-standard deviation above the minority
mean, her graduation probability would be 2.5 percentage points higher at UCLA than at
UC Riverside.
To get a sense of the potential importance of match effects, we predict graduation prob-
abilities at each campus for different percentiles of the minority academic index using
Specification 421. Table 6 ranks the campuses from highest to lowest predicted graduation
probabilities for different percentiles of the academic index holding fixed the remaining
characteristics (family income, the Dale and Krueger measures, etc.) at the minority sam-
ple average22. The rankings vary substantially across the academic index distribution. UC
Santa Cruz and UC Riverside are the top two campuses for those at the 10th percentile or
the 25th percentile of the academic index distribution yet are the bottom two campuses
at the 90th percentile. At the other extreme, UCLA ranks second to last for the 10th and
25th percentiles yet is the top campus for those at the 90th percentile.
Table 6 also makes clear that the heterogeneity in graduation rates across universities is
particularly large for those at the bottom of the distribution. The gap between the highest
and lowest graduation rates across campuses for students at the 10th percentile of the
academic index was 15.8 percentage points. For students at the 75th percentile of the
academic index, the gap between the highest and lowest graduation rates was a third of
the size at 5.2 percentage points.
6 Decomposition of post-Prop 209 graduation gains
The previous section illustrated that the match between the student and the univer-
sity is important for graduation rates. Relatively less-prepared minority students see
higher graduation rates at lower-ranked campuses while the reverse is true for the
more-prepared students. Coupled with the gains in graduation rates post-Prop 209, this
suggests the possibility Prop 209 improved graduation rates in part due to improving the
match between the student and the campus.
But there are at least two other reasons Prop 209 may have improved graduation rates.
The first is selection, as affirmative action bans may result in students who had the
lowest probability of graduating no longer being admitted to any campus in the UC sys-
tem. While Section 3 accounted for selection on observables, minority students in the
post-Prop 209 period also may have been stronger on unobservables.
The second is that universities responded to affirmative action bans by changing how











Table 6 Rankings of UC campuses by predicted graduation rates at various percentiles of the high school academic index percentiles based onminority
coefficients estimates†
Percentile of the Minority Academic Index
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
UC Santa Cruz 0.611 UC Santa Cruz 0.627 UC Irvine 0.648 UC Irvine 0.689 UCLA 0.726
UC Riverside 0.602 UC Riverside 0.621 UC Santa Cruz 0.645 UC Santa Barbara 0.674 UC Irvine 0.725
UC Irvine 0.571 UC Irvine 0.607 UC Riverside 0.642 UC San Diego 0.666 UC San Diego 0.721
UC Santa Barbara 0.567 UC Santa Barbara 0.600 UC Santa Barbara 0.637 UCLA 0.664 UC Santa Barbara 0.707
UC Berkeley 0.535 UC Berkeley 0.574 UC Berkeley 0.617 UC Riverside 0.663 UC Berkeley 0.699
UC San Diego 0.488 UC San Diego 0.543 UC San Diego 0.604 UC Santa Cruz 0.663 UC Davis 0.694
UCLA 0.465 UCLA 0.527 UCLA 0.596 UC Berkeley 0.661 UC Riverside 0.682
UC Davis 0.453 UC Davis 0.510 UC Davis 0.573 UC Davis 0.637 UC Santa Cruz 0.679
Data Source: UCOP.
†Average predicted graduation probabilities in parentheses. The predicted probabilities were formed using the estimated coefficients for Specification 4 of (5) for minorities and were predicted using the characteristics of
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performed differently with the bans. With respect to universities, it is possible that
they respond by instituting programs and activities that try to improve the graduation
prospects of those minority students and those from disadvantaged backgrounds that did
enroll after the ban. These might include instituting or improving tutoring and counsel-
ing programs, especially for freshman, in order to help them get through their first year
of collegiate studies, reduce drop-out rates and, thereby, improve graduation rates. There
is anecdotal evidence that UC campuses did take actions after Prop 209 to improve stu-
dent retention rates. For example, UCLA changed the way its introductory courses for
first year students were organized in the wake of Prop 209 in an attempt to improve the
retention of “disadvantaged students”23.While some of these efforts were direct responses
to the passage of Prop 209, others appear to have been in response to the rising (and
continuing) attention to retaining college enrollees, especially those from disadvantaged
groups24. We note that the efforts by UC campuses to improve outreach and retention
of minority students after Prop 20925 could not directly target racial and ethnic groups,
which was deemed a violation of ban on the use of race and ethnicity “in the operation
of ... public education” (Text of Proposition 209)26. This led to a restructuring of official
campus programs to target disadvantaged, rather than only minority, students based on
“academic profiles, personal backgrounds and social and environmental barriers that may
affect [a student’s] university experience, retention and graduation27.” As a result, some of
these retention efforts in response to, or coincident with, Prop 209 may have affected the
graduation rates of both minority and non-minority students.
With respect to students, the imposition of affirmative action bans like Prop 209 also
may have changed the stereotypes about the capabilities of minorities admitted to college
that may result in either increased effort levels of minority students or greater returns to
minority student effort. In a study using the same data sources as this paper, Antonovics
and Sander (2013) find that the passage of Prop 209 did not find much evidence of what
they refer to as a “chilling effect,” of Prop 209 among minorities i.e., a decrease in the
probability of enrolling at a UC campus among minorities who were accepted. As a pos-
sible explanation for the lack of this chilling effect, they speculate that the the elimination
of affirmative action in admissions could have made minorities more comfortable, and as
a result were more successful, because they were now attending schools were their pro-
fessors and fellow students no longer perceived that minorities were admitted to their
campuses based primarily on race or ethnicity but, rather, were admitted based on their
academic preparation.
In this section we seek to separate out the gains in graduation rates after Prop 209
was implemented into three components: matching, selection, and a residual component.
We refer to this residual component as behavioral response, which could have been the
types of responses by universities and/or students noted above. We begin by showing our
decomposition strategy and then discuss how Prop 209 affected the allocation of minori-
ties across campuses. Next, we discuss how to separate out the behavioral response from
selection. Finally, we show the decomposition results.
6.1 Overview
We begin with an overview of how our decomposition is conducted. Denote the pol-
icy regime as r ∈ {PRE,POST} and x as the set of observed characteristics of students
that affect the probability of graduating from a particular UC campus j as well as the
2014, 3:7
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/7
Arcidiacono et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 19 of 29
probability of being assigned to campus j′. Here, assignment refers to which particular
UC campus j a student that enrolled in the UC system attended. Using Bayes’ rule, we can
express the unconditional probability of a minority student in regime r graduating from
college as:





Pr(g = 1|j, x, r)Pr(j|x, r)Pr(x|r), (6)
where Pr(g = 1|j, x, r) is characterized by the graduation production function for campus
j in regime r, given characteristics, x; Pr(j|x, r) is the probability of attending campus j
given characteristics x and regime r, and Pr(x|r) denotes the distribution of observed
characteristics x under regime r. The inner sum in (6) is over the possible campuses and
the outer sum is over the possible observed characteristics. The difference in graduation
rates across the two periods can be expressed as:












Pr(g = 1|j, x,PRE)Pr(j|x,PRE)Pr(x|PRE)
The expression in (7) represents a natural way of characterizing the three channels
through which Prop 209 affected graduation rates: (i) through campus assignment,
Pr(j|x, r), which, in turn, characterizes matching; (ii) through the graduation production
function, Pr(g = 1|j, x, r); and (iii) through the distribution of the observed characteristics
of minority enrollment in the UC system under regime r, Pr(x|r)28.
To isolate how Prop 209 affected graduation rates through matching, we use the param-
eter estimates from the graduation production functions and the distribution of observed
characteristics from the pre-Prop 209 period to characterize the differences in graduation












Pr(g = 1|j, x,PRE)Pr(j|x,PRE)Pr(x|PRE)
Given the post-Prop 209 assignment rules, we can examine how changes in campus-
specific graduation production functions (BR) – which is what we mean by behavioral
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Finally, we examine changes in selection of minority students enrolled in the UC sys-
tem across regimes, using how the distribution of observed characteristics of minority












Pr(g = 1|j, x,POST)Pr(j|x,POST)Pr(x|PRE)
The sum of the three changes then gives the total change in graduation rates pre- and
post-Prop 209.
T = M + BR + S. (11)
In Section 5, we presented a Baseline specification for the campus-specific minority
graduation production functions, Pr(g = 1|j, x, r), displayed in (4) and specifications
with Dale-Krueger controls in (5). Parameter estimates for the pre-Prop 209 versions
(r = PRE) of these specifications were presented in Table 5 and Additional file 1: Table S3.
To perform the above decompositions, we also need parameter estimates of these same
production functions for the post-Prop 209 regime, i.e., for Pr(g = 1|j, x,POST). The
parameter estimates derived from post-Prop 209 data are found in Additional file 1:
Table S5 and Table S6, respectively. The estimates for φ0jr and φ1jr differ across the pre-
and post-Prop 209 regimes (Table 5 vs. Additional file 1: Table S5), suggesting there were
behavioral responses to the Prop 209 in the graduation rates of minority students depend-
ing on their academic preparation (AI). But, we also find differences in the influences
of the various Dale-Krueger controls (Additional file 1: Table S3 vs. Additional file 1:
Table S6), suggesting that some care will need to be taken in order to truly separate behav-
ioral responses from selection. Below, in Section 6.3, we outline ways to bound the relative
importance of these two components in our decomposition of the Prop 209 graduation
gains for minorities.
The rest of this section outlines how the remaining components of the decomposition
are calculated as well as how we perform the decomposition.
6.2 Graduation gains due to matching
We first consider how Prop 209 affected the allocation of minority students across the dif-
ferent UC campuses. We use the same regressors for x that were included in our Baseline
specification of the campus-specific graduation production functions in (4). We estimate
the probability of being assigned to campus j, conditional on having enrolled in one of
the UC campuses and as a function of x with a multinomial logit specification and allow
the coefficients to differ across the two regimes29. The probability of being assigned to
campus j in regime r given characteristics x is then:
Pr(j|x, r) = exp(xαjr)∑
j exp(xαjr)
(12)
Note that we do not include the Dale and Krueger controls when examining the assign-
ment of students to campuses. Clearly these controls have different interpretations in the
two regimes and implicitly include the dependent variable: if the student did not apply
to a particular campus or was not admitted then that student could not be assigned to
the campus. Estimates of our allocation mechanism will under-predict unobserved ability
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at the top campuses and over-predict unobserved ability at campuses with lower rank-
ings. However, this will not affect the results of our decomposition because we have
specified unobserved ability to have the same effect on graduation probabilities at all cam-
puses. Indeed, if matching on unobservables is important, the strategy we use is likely to
underestimate the importance of match effects.
Estimates of the minority assignment rules for the two regimes are given in Additional
file 1: Table S4. Table 7 gives the predicted probability of pre-Prop 209 students being
assigned to each of the campuses using both the pre- and post-Prop 209 campus assign-
ment rules for minorities. Assigning pre-Prop 209 students to UC campuses according to
the post-Prop 209 rules shifts minority students out of the top three campuses and into
the bottom five, with particularly large shifts to UC Riverside. As noted above, some of
the students assigned to UC Riverside likely would not have been admitted to any cam-
pus in the UC system. It remains an outstanding question whether these students would
then be better matched at institutions ranked below the UC campuses, such as those
in the California State system, and therefore would graduate at an even higher rate or
whether these institutions produce lower graduation rates than UC Riverside at all levels
of academic preparation.
We then predict graduation probabilities using the two different assignment rules to cal-
culate minority graduation gains from Prop 209 due to matching. Table 8 gives the results
for each of our five specifications, both overall and for each quartile of the academic
index30. Absent the Dale and Krueger controls (baseline specification), the gains from
matching are positive but very small. Including the Dale and Krueger controls increases
the overall minority graduation rate between 0.64 percentage points and 1.2 percentage
points.
These estimated gains in minority graduation rates may seem small, given the substan-
tial heterogeneity in graduation rates shown in Table 6. But the size of these gains is more
indicative of the limited scope for reallocating students. For example, students at the very
bottom of the distribution will be allocated to UC Riverside regardless of whether we
use the pre- or post-Prop 209 campus assignment rules for minorities. And those at the
top of the distribution may be hurt by shifting to the new rules. The last four rows of
Table 8 illustrate the distributional effects by showing the graduation gains from match-
ing for different quartiles of the academic index. Here we see that the gains are largest for
those in the bottom quartile followed by those in the next-lowest quartile. These students
Table 7 Predicted distribution of pre-Prop 209minority enrollees across UC campuses,
using using pre- and post-Prop 209 assignment rules†
Assignment Rule
Pre-Prop 209 Post-Prop 209
Predicted Predicted Difference
UC Berkeley 0.178 0.100 -0.078
UCLA 0.217 0.140 -0.077
UC San Diego 0.084 0.072 -0.012
UC Davis 0.118 0.127 0.009
UC Irvine 0.087 0.113 0.026
UC Santa Barbara 0.144 0.152 0.008
UC Santa Cruz 0.077 0.107 0.030




Arcidiacono et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 22 of 29
Table 8 Estimated gains in minority graduation rates from Prop 209 due tomatching
Model Specification:
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Gain 0.13% 0.64% 0.69% 1.20% 0.77%
AI Quartile 1 0.81% 1.51% 1.45% 2.20% 1.66%
AI Quartile 2 0.18% 0.80% 0.85% 1.45% 0.96%
AI Quartile 3 -0.22% 0.26% 0.36% 0.80% 0.40%
AI Quartile 4 -0.26% -0.01% 0.09% 0.36% 0.06%
See Table 5 for descriptions of Specifications 1-4 in this table.
Final four rows of the table give estimated matching effects for only those in each quartile of the pre-209 Minority AI
distribution.
benefit from being shifted down to campuses where they are more competitive. Smaller,
or negative, gains are seen for those in the top two quartiles, both because these students
are better matches for higher-ranked campuses and because there is less across-campus
heterogeneity in graduation rates for better-prepared students.
6.3 Bounding behavioral responses to Prop 209 and selection effects
We now turn to how to isolate the behavioral response to Prop 209, i.e., BR in (8), using
the pre-Prop 209 and post-Prop 209 production function parameter estimates found in
Table 5 and Additional file 1: Tables S3, S5 and S6, respectively31. As noted above, the
issue is how to adjust the Dale and Krueger effects across the two regimes. We can obtain
the predicted effects from the Dale and Krueger measures under specification k for a
student i in regime r using:
PDK (k)ir = DK (k)ir ψˆ(k)r (13)
from equation (5). However, we need to be able to map the pre-Prop 209 effects of the
Dale and Krueger controls, PDK (k)ir , into their post-Prop 209 counterparts. We do this in
two ways, one of which we believe provides an upper bound on the increase in graduation
rates due to the behavioral response, with the other providing a lower bound.
We first assume that the distribution of unobservables is the same both in the pre- and
post-Prop 209 periods among minority students admitted to any UC campus, regardless
of whether or not the student ultimately enrolled in the UC system. For those admitted
to at least one campus, the nth percentile PDK (k)PRE is matched to the nth percentile of













Pr(g = 1|j, x,PRE)Pr(j|x,POST)Pr(x|PRE)
Hence whenwe calculate the change in behavioral response, we replace the contribution
of PDK (k)POST to our estimate of Pr(g = 1|j, x,POST) for each student with the value of
PDK (k)PRE at the same percentile of the distribution for admitted students.
The behavioral response as estimated above is likely an upper bound on the behavioral
response because our matching procedure assumes the unobservable quality of minority
students accepted to at least oneUC campus is the same in the pre and post-Prop 209 peri-
ods. However, due to more students being rejected from all of the UC campuses, minority
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students who enrolled post-Prop 209 are likely stronger in the unobservable dimensions
captured by our Dale and Krueger controls than their pre-Prop 209 counterparts. The
share of minority applicants who are rejected from all UC campuses where they submitted
applications rose by 9.2% from the pre-period to the post-period.
In our second method, we drop the bottom 9.2% of pre-Prop 209 admits. We then
repeat the matching for the remaining pre-Prop 209 students’ Dale and Krueger effects
to their post-Prop 209 counterparts by matching percentiles of their distributions. Since
we assume in this version of the matching procedure that the excess UC rejections in
the post-Prop 209 regime represent the least prepared minority students, in contrast to
the previous assumption that the distribution did not change, we consider this method a
lower bound on behavioral response, and therefore also an upper bound on the effect of
selection.
To implement the procedure, we now have the issue of calculating PDK (k)i,POST for the
bottom 9.2% of minority admits in the pre-Prop 209 period that we just dropped from the
matching. We assume that, had we observed the values of PDK (k)i,POST for those rejected
from all of the UC campuses in the post-Prop 209 period but who would have been
accepted to at least one of the campuses in the pre-Prop 209 period, the distribution
of PDK (k)i,POST would be normal, implying what we actually observe is a truncated dis-
tribution. Given the truncated distribution, we can calculate the variance for the full
distribution and forecast PDK (k)i,POST for those in the left tail.
6.4 Decomposition results
The results for the decomposition for our five specifications are given in Table 9, showing
both the level changes in graduation rates due to each of the three factors (matching,
behavioral response, and selection) as well as the share of the total post-Prop 209 gain.
The first row gives the matching effects from the first row of Table 8, but now adding
the share of the total graduation gain. The share of the total is very small absent the Dale
and Krueger controls, with the Dale and Krueger controls the share ranges from 14.7% to
27.7% of the total gain.
The next set of rows present our estimates of the upper and lower bounds for the behav-
ioral response accompanied by the corresponding estimates of the selection component.
With the Dale and Krueger controls, the upper bound on the behavioral response ranges
from 2.2 percentage points to 2.9 percentage points, or between 50% and 67% of the total.
The lower bound estimates range from 1.0 percentage points to 1.5 percentage points,
or between 23% and 33% of the total. Interestingly, these gains, particularly those for the
lower bound, line up well with the reduced-form gains for whites found in Table 3.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined how the match between the student and the college
she attends affects college graduation rates. We have found evidence that less-selective
campuses in the UC system tend to be better at graduating less-prepared students, with
more selective campuses better at graduating more-prepared students. These results are
relevant to the debate over the merits of affirmative action in university admissions to the
extent that affirmative action leads to inefficient sorting.
Using data before and after an affirmative action ban, we found evidence that Prop











Table 9 Decomposing the effect of Prop 209 onminority graduation rates
Model Specification:
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Share of Share of Share of Share of
Level Total Level Total Level Total Level Total Level Total
(A) Improved Matching 0.13 3.0% 0.64 14.7% 0.69 15.8% 1.20 27.7% 0.77 17.8%
Upper Bound on Behavioral Response
(B) Behavioral Response 3.06 70.5% 2.91 67.0% 2.92 67.1% 2.21 50.8% 2.80 64.4%
(C) Selection 1.15 26.6% 0.79 18.2% 0.74 17.1% 0.93 21.5% 0.77 17.8%
Lower Bound on Behavioral Response
(B’) Behavioral Response 1.44 33.2% 1.33 30.7% 0.43 9.8% 1.01 23.3%
(C’) Selection 2.26 52.1% 2.33 53.5% 2.72 62.5% 2.56 58.9%
Specifications as listed in Table 5.
Selection effect calculated as Total Increase −(A) − (B).
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However, the effects were relatively small and we can say little about what happened
to those that did not attend a UC campus as a result of Prop 20932. Given large
differences in academic preparation due to differences in the family backgrounds of
students and the quality of the primary and secondary schools they attended, there is
little scope for dramatic shifts in graduation outcomes by re-sorting of students across
campuses33. That being said, our results indicate that better matching of students to
campuses based on academic preparation does produce improvements in graduation
rates, especially for those students in the bottom part of the distribution of aca-
demic preparation. Further, while matching effects are small when comparing five-year
graduation rates, a companion paper (Arcidiacono et al. 2013) shows that mismatch
effects are much larger when looking at persistence in STEM fields and in time to
graduation.
The size of the change in graduation rates not accounted for by matching or selec-
tion indicates that other responses to Prop 209 were important. The anecdotal evidence
that we cite offers one possible response that is quite intriguing, namely that the impo-
sition of an affirmative action ban may have induced universities to expand their efforts
to keep students from dropping out and completing their studies. Previous studies of
affirmative action have ignored the potential for such institutional responses. More atten-
tion should be focused on them and their role in accounting for the effects of affirmative
action bans.
More generally, finding ways to improve the college graduation rates of minorities -
regardless of the motivation - would appear to be of growing importance, given the evi-
dence that attending but not graduating from college has sizable consequences. Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) have shown that earnings and employment prospects of less educated
workers have declined sharply since the late seventies. For example, the hourly wage of
college graduates in the U.S. was approximately 1.5 times the hourly wage of the typical
high-school graduate in 1979, but this ratio has increased to 1.95 by 2009. Hence, cur-
rent inequalities across races may perpetuate or even exacerbate if graduation rates of
minorities are not improved.
Endnotes
1In April 2014, the Court upheld, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
the right of Michigan’s citizens to amend that State’s constitution to prohibit the State
from engaging in affirmative action in public employment, higher education and
contracting. This case follows the 2013 Supreme Court ruling in Fisher v. University of
Texas which made clear that the use of race in college admissions is restricted in
remitting the case back to the appellate court.
2See the debate over mismatch effects in law schools in Sander (2004, 2005a, 2005b),
Ayres and Brooks (2005), Ho (2005), Chambers et al. (2005), Barnes (2007) and
Rothstein and Yoon (2008).
3Based on five-year graduation rates. We use five-year gradation rates throughout our
analysis.
4This may be a result of the UC system placing more weight on characteristics
correlated with race after Prop 209 since they could not explicitly take race into account.
See Antonovics and Backes (2013b) for a discussion.
5See Antonovics and Sander (2013) for a more detailed discussion of this data set.
6The corresponding data for Asian American and Other Races (including un-reported)
are given in Additional file 1: Table S1.
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7The number of California public high school graduates by race and year is given at
http://www.cpec.ca.gov/StudentData/StudentSnapshot.ASP?DataReport=KGrads. The
number of California applicants by race and year can be found at http://statfinder.ucop.
edu. While not all of the minorities applying, enrolling, or graduating from UC
campuses are from California’s public high schools, a large fraction are and we use this
benchmark to account for the trends in the numbers of minorities at risk to go to college.
8Given that totals in Table 1 in each category include occasional cases with missing
data; when calculating average sample characteristics, individuals missing that data are
dropped. This includes enrollees with missing graduation information, so Graduation
Rate in Table 1 is not identical to graduates/enrollees.
9Graduation rates are measured as graduating in 5 years or less. There are a small
number of individuals that are listed as graduating but do not have a graduation time. In
the period we analyze, these individuals are almost exclusively listed as having a major
classified as ‘Other’. We drop these individuals from our sample though our qualitative
results are unaffected by the treatment of these individuals.
10We are unable to determine whether, after Prop 209, these more advantaged
minorities who applied and were accepted to a UC campus went to colleges not subject
to Prop 209, i.e., private colleges in California or public or private colleges outside of the
state. But we doubt that they disproportionately ended up at less-selective public
colleges in the state, i.e., at CSU campuses or one of California’s community colleges, or
not attending college.
11For example, Turner (2004) finds that students of mothers with a college degree have
a 14 percentage point higher probability of attaining a BA degree than do students
whose mothers do not.
12The 1997 U.S. News & World Report rankings of National Universities are based on
1996–97 data, the academic year before Prop 209 went into effect. The rankings of the
various campuses were: UC Berkeley (27); UCLA (31); UC San Diego (34); UC Irvine
(37); UC Davis (40); UC Santa Barbara (47); UC Santa Cruz (NR); and UC Riverside
(NR). The one exception is that we rank UC Davis ahead of UC Irvine. The academic
index is significantly higher for UC Davis and students who are admitted to both
campuses and attend one of them are more likely to choose UC Davis. See Table 4.
13Additional file 1: Table S2. presents the coefficient estimates for the extended sets of
control variables.
14See Epple et al. (2008) for such an equilibrium model of college admissions under
affirmative action and when it is banned.
15See Dillon and Smith (2009) for reasons why students end up over-matched or
under-matched.
16If students know their academic preparation then they would presumably internalize
the fact that their graduation rates are lower at the more selective campus. In this
regard, students may be interested in a different outcome. For example, selective
universities may provide amenities to minority students that more than compensate for
the worse graduation probabilities. However, students may not be well informed about
their success probabilities. For instance, Arcidiacono et al. (2011) show that affirmative
action can lead minority students to be worse off if universities have private information
about how well the student will perform at their school. In this regard, Bettinger et al.
(2013) and Hoxby and Avery 2012 show that information may be a serious concern
among low income students.
17Campus B having a comparative, but not absolute, advantage over A with respect to
graduations among less prepared students, as in Panel (a) of Figure 1, is not enough to
generate the implications of the mismatch hypothesis. To see this, note that if higher
quality colleges have an absolute advantage in graduating all students as in Panel (a),
then a less prepared minority student with AI1 (AI1 < AI) that was admitted to Campus
A under affirmative action will experience a lower, rather than higher, graduation rate
after affirmative action is banned and she can no longer attend Campus A.
2014, 3:7
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18We estimate (4) with the Linear Probability Model.
19See, for example, Black et al. (2001), Dale and Krueger (2002), Black and Smith
(2004), and Hoxby (2009).
20Additional file 1: Table S3 presents estimates of the coefficients on the various sets of
control variables that were included in the alternative selection-corrected specifications
of the campus-specific graduation production functions in (4) and (5) but not presented
in Table 5.
21Relative rankings of the campuses in terms of predicted graduation rates are fairly
similar across the different specifications.
22Those with lower academic indexes are likely worse off on the other characteristics
as well but since the estimated match effects vary only across the academic index,
varying these other observed characteristics neither changes the ranking of the
campuses nor does it change the differences in graduation probabilities across campuses
conditional on the percentile of the academic index.
23See “Intercollegiate Forums at UCLA discuss Retention of Minorities,” Daily Bruin,
March 2, 1998.
24See “Scholars urge Early Help for Minorities,” UCLA Today, March 16, 1998.
25A brief description of how outreach programs have been implemented can be found
in “In California, Push for College Diversity Starts Earlier,” The New York Times, May 7,
2013.
26See “Prop. 209 Mandates Changes on Campus,” UCLA Today, October 10, 1997. As
noted in Horn and Flores 2003, some of the post-Prop 209 efforts to improve the
retention of minority enrollees at UC Berkeley were handled by student-run
organizations who were not directly subject this provision of Prop 209.
27“Prop. 209 Mandates Changes on Campus,” UCLA Today, October 10, 1997.
28Note that here we are effectively assuming that universities change their graduation
production functions in response to the changes in the assignment rules as the primary
effect of Prop 209 was to change how minorities were allocated to colleges.
29Here we ignore the fact that some of these students would not be admitted to any of
the campuses post-Prop 209. This aspect of selection process is accounted for by
changes in the distribution of the xs, Pr(x|r), across regimes.
30As before, the quartiles are assigned based on the academic indexes for minority
enrollees in the pre-Prop 209 period.
31It is possible, however, that universities may have implemented policies to improve
graduation rates prior to Prop-209 that took awhile to come into effect. In this case, the
behavioral response was not to Prop 209 itself.
32While estimates suggest selective campuses see a drop in minority enrollment
following affirmative action bans (Long 2004; Hinrichs 2012), overall college enrollment
rates remain relatively unaffected following a ban (Backes 2012; Hinrichs 2012).
33These results are consistent with Arcidiacono and Koedel (2014) who find that most
of the black/white differences in college graduation rates stem from differences in
student academic preparation.
Additional file
: Appendix. Table S1. Characteristics of UC applicants, admits, and enrollees by race, pre-Prop 209
and change post Prop 209. Table S2. Coefficient estimates on extended controls variables for UC graduation rate
regressions in Equations (1) and (2). Table S3. Coefficient estimates for selection-corrected campus graduation
production functions in (4) and (5) not reported in Table 5, using pre-Prop 209 data. Table S4. Coefficients from pre-
and post-Prop 209 minority enrollee campus assignment rules. Table S5. Intercept and slope for UC campus-specific
minority graduation rates for post-Prop 209 period. Table S6. Coefficient estimates for selection-corrected campus
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